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ABSTRACT
The overall goal of this research is to develop a better understanding of how innovation
can, and should, happen in the space sector. Part A: Towards an Empirical Measure of
Spacecraft Innovation, frames the discussion of innovation in the space sector and creates a
platform for future analysis. To accomplish this, it addresses three aspects of the task of
measurement. First, it surveys several distinct literatures to establish precedence for
defining a spacecraft innovation metric. Second, the conceptual trade-offs associated with
adopting this principle in the context of communication satellites are elucidated and
treated. By defining product boundaries along the dimensions of product scope and market
transactions, three paradigms for measurement are proposed; namely, 1) the
communication satellite enterprise; 2) the physical satellite; and 3) communication service.
Third, under the constraints of historical data collection realities, next-best estimators are
put forward as surrogates for the parameters required in implementing the proposed
metrics. Based on these surrogates, the relative merits of each measurement paradigm are
illustrated through sample analyses.
Part B: Lessons from Communication Satellite History (1964-2006), captures the first detailed
attempt to quantitatively analyze innovation in the space sector. Building on the
communication satellite innovation metric (developed in Part A) and a spacecraft
innovation framework (developed as part of ongoing work) Part B presents a preliminary
model of communication satellite innovation. In addition to innovation being a function of
the rate of performance normalized by price, spacecraft innovation is shown to be strongly
influenced by characteristics of the customer-contractor contractual relationship.
Specifically, DoD contracts tend to result in a lower level of innovation on average as
compared to other customers and particular customer-contractor pairs perform differently
and exhibit a second order relationship in time. No pair was observed to sustain better
than average innovation in the long run.
Thesis supervisor: Annalisa L. Weigel
Title: Jerome C. Hunsacker Assistant Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and of
Engineering Systems
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NOMENCLATURE
ai =
c =
C =
Ci =
CPF =
gi =
i =-
(In, r, Is, Av)
I(t) =-
Icuiconi
IM =
Mconti =
Mcusti =
MoS =
0(t) =
P =
PPP =
QP/F =
t =
T =
Tuseful =
TP =
W =
xi =
Yi =
Relative weight of the ith characteristic
ith resource constraint
Cost
Capacity
contractual parameter
Cost per function
generational parameter
Innovation
= Capability Parameters: Integrity, Rate, Isolation, Availability
Innovation input function
= customer contractor interaction effect
innovation metric
contractor main effect
customer main effect
Minute of service
Innovation output function
Price
Price per performance
Quality (subscript P = performance, F = functional)
time
Design life
Useful life
Technological progress
Power
Quantitative level of the ith functional characteristic
Quantitative level of the ith performance characteristic
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1 INTRODUCTION
On October 4th, 1957, the faint beeps of Sputnik ushered in the dawn of the space age. A
mere 83.6 Kg, with a diameter less than 58 cm,[2] the Soviet built satellite represented a
challenge to the, until then presumed, American technical and military superiority.[3] The
use of space, which began as a cold war race between super powers, has since blossomed
into a platform for a global industry. Half a century later, more than 900 operational
satellites orbit the earth, operated by 40 countries.[4] Compared to Sputnik's beach ball-
sized stature, modern communications satellites are enormous, weighing in at 5000 Kg.[4]
Functional performance has increased so extensively that it is hard even to compare the
two levels. Applications today include communications, navigation, remote-sensing,
scientific research and environmental monitoring. Satellites have become indispensable
tools in our daily lives, enabling on-board GPS in personal vehicles, global communications,
weather forecasts and early warning for natural disasters among others.
However, despite a rich legacy of delivering impressive technology, government space
acquisitions - both military and civil - are increasingly characterized by schedule slips and
cost overruns. According to the House of Representatives' Report of the Committee on
Armed Services, "simply put, the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process is broken.
The ability of the Department to conduct the large scale acquisitions required to ensure our
future national security is a concern of the committee."[5] Similarly, a recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report highlights the level of underperformance on a series of
space projects, stating that
DoD's space system acquisitions E
have experienced problems over "
the past several decades that have
driven up costs by hundreds of
millions, even billions, of dollars;
stretched schedules by years; and
increased performance risks. In
some cases, capabilities have not
been delivered to the warfighter
after decades of development.[1]
ABIF W S EB WMB W"O WS 11The programs featured in Figure 2 A Pt
include the Advanced Extremely High N do
Frequency (AEHF) satellites, the &oaZ"r.bit progUm is i hob pmais
Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) and
the Mobile User Objective System V adobw oim
(MUOS), which are all communication
satellites, and the Global Positioning Figure 1 Additional Months Needed since
System (GPS) II.[1] Program Start[1]
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On the civil side, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) record isn't better.
For example, the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL),
originally priced at $650-million will now cost an
estimated $2-billion.[6] Similarly, cost estimates of
the James Webb Space Telescope, set to replace
Hubble, have grown from $1-billion to $4.5-
billion. [6] These are not isolated instances. A former
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science
reported to the New York Times that:
NASA's next two weather satellites, built for
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, have now inflated to over
$3.5 billion each! The list goes on: N.P.P.,
S.D.O., LISA Pathfinder, Constellation and
more. You don't have to know what the
abbreviations and acronyms mean to get it:
Our space program is running inefficiently,
and without sufficient regard to cost
performance.[7]
(on Wftuns In 2W0 dafimr)
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Figure 2 Differences in Unit Life
Cycle Cost from Key Decision Point (KDP) B
(Program Start) and 2007 Estimate.[1]
This record of poor performance has not gone without comment. Multiple blue ribbon
panels have been convened and many Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports
written (key recommendations summarized in Figure 3). The NASA reports abound as well
(see for example Refs. [8-13]). Bringing to bear the members' vast experience working in
the current acquisition paradigm of large monolithic spacecraft, their recommendations
emphasize a "back-to-basics" philosophy (Le., maturing payload technologies outside of
acquisition programs, increasing the technical competence of the acquisition core and
emphasizing the importance of front-end specification).[14] One key theme of the
recommendations, that programs will be less likely to overrun if only mature (i.e., proven)
technologies are acquired, seems intuitively true. It also raises an important questions, are
billions of public funds being allocated to government space projects so that they can play
it safe? Where is the boundary between pushing limits and controlling costs?
Government space acquisition systems exist in part, because some military needs are
unique and/or sufficiently important to national security that their fulfillment cannot be
left up to the free market. Other common justifications include that exploration is an
important goal; or that there are economic benefits derived from government investment
in space (estimates of the rate of return on NASA's spending reach as high as 23:1).[15]
Whatever the actual numbers, the point remains that NASA and the DoD are in the business
of pushing technological boundaries; an expensive pursuit
12 I
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, Restore funding for testing space technologies X X
0$ Maintain U.S. technological lead in space X
Keep R&D separate from systems acquisition X X
SIldentify technology for rapid exploitation and control x
Establish Presidential and NSC space advisory groups X
Integrate defense and intelligence space activities X
Improve front-end systems engineering (req's=resources) X X X X X
Improve collaboration on requirements X X X X
Budget space programs to most probable (80/20) cost X
E Evaluate contractor cost credibility in source selections X
cn Conduct independent program assessments at MDA's X
Do not allow requirements creep X X X X
E Match PM tenure with delivery of a product X X X X
Pursue incremental increases in capability X
Withold contractor award fees when goals not met X
Establish a stable program funding account X
Structure development to achieve lOC within 3-7 years X
Recognize space as top national security priority X
Deter and defend against hostile acts in space X
End practice of appointing only flight-rated CINCSPACE X
Incentivize government career paths in acquisitions X X X X X
>% Improve workforce technical competence X X X X X
Research systems architecting design tools X
Establish mission success as guiding principle X
Compete acquisitions only when in best interest of gov't X
Develop integrated strategy for R&D and acquisitions X X
Encourage LSI to compete major subsystems X
Evaluate gov't internal training programs for acquisition X
Figure 3 Key Findings from Recent Studies of the DoD Acquisition System [1-6]
While a more conservative approach might yield better (i.e., more accurate) cost estimates,
it wouldn't necessarily yield cheaper programs; explicitly pushing the boundaries of
knowledge is an expensive pursuit. Consider the commercial sector of the communication
satellite industry. Commercial satellite acquirers (e.g., Intelsat Inc.) have perfected the art
of developing communications satellites from paper-to-orbit in 3 years; on time and on
schedule.[16] They have achieved this by buying what they know. Consequently, many of
the major communication satellite technological improvements have come from
government research and development (R&D) programs rather than commercial
players.[17, 18] For example, Early Bird - the first commercial satellite, launched in 1965
by INTELSAT Corp. - followed directly from NASA's Syncom series. Similarly, NASA
introduced despun antennas, experimented with new frequency ranges (L-band, VHF, and
C-band) with ATS 1-5 in the mid 60s; three-axis stabilization, large deployable antennas,
and high power at S-band and L-band with ATS-6 in the late 60s; direct broadcasting using
-1 .3-
traveling wave tube amplifiers (TWTA) in the Ku-band in 1975. These and other NASA
inspired firsts (see Figure 4) formed the basis for modern satellite communications. [17]
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Thus, where government space acquisition systems have produced major technological
progress, they have failed to control costs and hit schedule targets. Conversely, where
commercial satellite buyers have succeeded in meeting cost and schedule goals, they have
failed to make major advances in the state of the art. Both present problems, acting on
different sides of the innovation equation.
SPACECRAFT INNOVATION: A measure of how performance outcomes
(as defined by the user), normalized by resource constraints (as
experienced by the producer), changes over time. This can equivalently
involve: a) generating a wholly new capability; or b) reducing the
resources required to achieve an existing capability (e.g., making the
system cheaper or lighter). (p. 18 of this thesis)
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1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT
While many recommendations have been made, and many actions have been taken to
address documented limitations of current space acquisition systems, a satisfactory
solution remains beyond reach. As framed above, innovation is an important goal of, and
justification for, space activities; be they military (new capabilities), civil (new capabilities
and economic benefits) and commercial (economic growth and profit). Further, it
integrates a core tradeoff in the mission of space agencies - push limits while controlling
costs. Yet, despite an extensive and growing literature on technology innovation, little work
has been done to apply insights from innovation theory to space acquisition reform.
Part of the problem is a poor understanding of how characteristics of the space sector (i.e.,
monopsony-oligopoly market structure and extremely complex robust products) impact
the way in which innovation can and should be encouraged. This can lead to inappropriate
choices of innovation strategies and, ultimately, to an environment that does not foster
innovation successfully. Since effective change is necessarily preceded by an increased
understanding of what is currently wrong, this research work aims to fill that gap by
identifying and explaining patterns of spacecraft innovation through an analysis of the
sector's history.
An innovation lens seems particularly relevant because where previous studies have taken
an experiential perspective - which necessarily leads to a focus on known problems within
the current system - the use of an innovation metric allows for a broad spectrum statistical
analysis of an entire sector. It is hoped that this holistic view will yield new insights that
will complement the body of thinking derived from the various blue ribbon reports. Before
any analysis can be done however, an approach to quantifying spacecraft innovation must
be developed and tested.
Although many of the ideas are applicable to spacecraft in general, this thesis focuses on
communication satellites in particular. This is because the market incorporates military,
civil and commercial players and it is one of the only classes of spacecraft that include a
statistically significant sample sized.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With the governing objective of gaining a better understanding of how innovation can, and
should, happen in the space sector, this thesis will seek to answer the following questions:
1. How can spacecraft innovation be meaningfully quantified and measured?
While a broad literature on measuring and forecasting technological change exists, it
is spread across multiple disciplines (including economics, technometrics, cost
estimation etc.) and little work has been done in the context of spacecraft.
Application to the space domain is non-trivial with constraints along the dimensions
of market structure, product complexity and data restrictions unique to space
assets. However, without such a metric, any discussion of the subject will remain
abstract.
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2. Using the aforementioned metric, what lessons can be learned from an analysis of the
history of the communication satellite sector?
Lessons of the past often provide a good baseline for what might happen in the
future. In a sense, the 50 year history of space endeavors creates a natural
experiment in satellite contracting. Leveraging the quantitative abstraction
developed in response to Q1, hypotheses for how innovation should be generated
can be tested.
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The body of this thesis is structured as two distinct parts, each serving to answer one of the
two research questions.
Part A: Towards an Empirical Measure of Spacecraft Innovation, frames the discussion of
innovation in the space sector and creates a platform for future analysis. To accomplish this, it
addresses three aspects of the task of measurement. First, it surveys several distinct
literatures to establish precedence for defining a spacecraft innovation metric. Second, the
conceptual trade-offs associated with adopting this principle in the context of
communication satellites are elucidated and treated. By defining product boundaries along
the dimensions of product scope and market transactions, three paradigms for
measurement are proposed; namely, 1) the communication satellite enterprise; 2) the
physical satellite; and 3) communication service. Third, under the constraints of historical
data collection realities, next-best estimators are put forward as surrogates for the
parameters required in implementing the proposed metrics. Based on these surrogates, the
relative merits of each measurement paradigm are illustrated through sample analyses and
comparison to previous work.
Part B: Lessons from Communication Satellite History (1964-2006), captures the first detailed
attempt to quantitatively analyze innovation in the space sector. Building on the
communication satellite innovation metric (developed in Part A) and a spacecraft
innovation framework (developed as part of ongoing work[14]) Part B presents a
preliminary model of communication satellite innovation. In addition to innovation being a
function of the rate of performance normalized by price, spacecraft innovation is shown to
be strongly influenced by characteristics of the customer-contractor contractual
relationship. Specifically, DoD contracts tend to result in a lower level of innovation on
average as compared to other customers and particular customer-contractor pairs perform
differently and exhibit a second order relationship in time.
Although the two parts of the thesis draw from similar literatures, their objectives and
methodologies are sufficiently different to merit splitting up the literature survey. As a
result relevant parts of the literature are introduced at the beginning of each of Parts A and
B.
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PART A: TOWARDS AN EMPIRICAL MEASURE OF
SPACECRAFT INNOVATION
With the overall goal of better understanding how innovation happens in the space sector,
Part A of this thesis develops a quantitative basis for future discussion. Specifically seeking
to answer the question: How can spacecraft innovation be meaningfully quantified and
measured? To accomplish this, Part A addresses three aspects of the task of measurement.
First, it surveys several distinct literatures to establish precedence for defining a spacecraft
innovation metric. Second, it elucidates and treats the trade-offs associated with defining
such an innovation metric, in the context of communication satellites; proposing both
idealized metrics and next-best estimators given the reality of incomplete historical. Third,
based on these surrogates, it implements and compares the proposed metrics. Finally, this
part examines how these results can be used to form the basis for an exploration of the
fundamental dynamics of innovation in the space sector.
1 7
2 DEFINITIONS, TRENDS AND METRICS
Innovation in the context of spacecraft has not been the subject of much scholarly work,
though the concept of innovation is widely studied in other domains. This section
summarizes the key insights from the broader innovation literature so that they may be
incorporated into the present work on spacecraft.
2.1 DEFINING SPACECRAFT INNOVATION
The term innovation means many things to many people, and the definition of spacecraft
innovation is less clear still. This section begins by surveying existing definitions of
technological innovation and posits a new one in the context of spacecraft (the focus of this
paper). The goal of this discussion is not merely to arrive at a synthesized definition of
spacecraft innovation but to define an operational framework through which multiple,
diverse satellite programs can be compared across history.
While both the process of innovation and the act of innovating are generally considered
positive, the consistency in conception ends there. Explicit definitions of innovation tend to
be either:
" so broad as to be all encompassing (e.g., the Oslo Manual[19] and Community
Innovation Survey[20] define technological innovations as comprising "implemented
technologically new products and processes and significant technological
improvements in products and processes")
e negatively constructed in such a way that while it may be clear what innovation is
not, there remains considerable ambiguity as to what innovation actually is (e.g., the
Oxford Innovation Handbook[21] presents the synthesized definition that
innovation is not invention; nor is it improvement, creativity or diffusion, although
the concepts are closely related. Where invention is the first occurrence of a new
product, process or idea, innovation requires that some novelty be carried out in
practice.)
e or emphasize a differentiation between types or phases of innovation (e.g., radical
vs incremental[22, 23] vs modular and architectural[24], process vs product[25],
fluid vs transitional vs specific phases,[26] lead user innovation,[27] etc...)
One common notion among these three classes of definitions is that innovation is a process
and thus can neither be observed nor measured through a static lens.[28] In fact, most
important innovations are in reality the sum of multiple interrelated inventions and
improvements that have been integrated into a commercialized product over time.[29]
Another common theme is that a new idea or capability becomes an innovation once
someone is willing to pay for it; "new" has no value unless people want it.
These two core concepts can be combined broadly to define spacecraft innovation as: a
measure of how performance outcome (as defined by the user), normalized by resource
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constraints (as experienced by the supplier), changes over time. This can equivalently
involve: a) generating a wholly new capability; or b) reducing the resources required to
achieve an existing capability (e.g., making the system cheaper or lighter). Formally:
1=dt LE It) J(1)
While the definition captured in Eq. (1) is still quite general, it can be tailored to specific
technology contexts and provides an operational framework for innovation analysis. In
addition, by treating the innovation process as a black box, it allows the indefinable details
of incremental change to be circumvented. In this way, multiple, historically and
architecturally diverse satellite programs can be compared directly, by carefully defining
system level inputs and outputs that can defensibly be measured over time[30]. The
selection of these inputs and outputs is relatively straightforward once the system
boundary has been clearly defined; however, defining that boundary is non-trivial and
depends on two questions:
1. Where is the line between buyers and sellers of "the product" drawn?
2. What constitutes the product?
While, a single answer to these questions may seem intuitively obvious at first, multiple,
equally legitimate and instructive, boundaries can be drawn in both the dimensions of
market and product scope. The remainder of this paper seeks to flesh-out the
implementation of Eq. (1) for the specific case of communication satellites.
2.2 ALTERNATIVE INNOVATION METRICS ALONG THE MARKET DIMENSION
Although no precedence was found for explicitly measuring satellite innovation,
quantitative techniques for measuring and forecasting technological progress have been
the subject of significant previous investigation (see Ref. [31] for a recent review paper).
The range of technological studies that have been conducted can be categorized as
technology function focused, market performance focused, or functional performance
focused. This section summarizes the key insights from each of the three categories. In the
below discussion, measures of quality map directly to the innovation output defined in Eq.
(1)
2.2.1 TECHNOLOGY FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (TFP)
The functional perspective is the most traditional of technology forecasting approaches. A
metric is determined, which characterizes the technological artifact under study, so that
the evolution of said metric can be studied empirically. In the forecasting context, an
equation is then fit so as to best describe, and predict, the technological progress. [32] It is
commonly held that the technological state of the art (SOA), or essential quality, is often
best represented by a tradeoff surface describing the intersection among functional
capabilities per Eq. (2).[31]
19
QF a
(2)
The concept here is that innovation happens in the design space, as particular technologies
are improved over time, but is experienced in the use space, as those technology
improvements combine to produce system performance. The existence and evolution of
trade-off surfaces has been demonstrated mathematically in several empirical technology
studies.[33, 34] This approach has proven useful for predicting the direction of near-term
technology change; however, because of the detailed technical knowledge required for each
system under study and the mathematical complexity associated with fitting multi-
dimensional expansion surfaces, the insights tend not to be generalizable.
2.2.2 MARKET PERFORMANCE PERSPECTIVE (MPP)
The market perspective takes an economic view of innovation. The idea is that the
complexity of design interactions can be circumvented if attention is limited to changes
that impact the market value of the product.[30, 35] In fact, in competitive markets for
commodity products, hedonic regression can be used to infer efficiency improvements
from observed price fluctuations. [36] Specifically, it is assumed that changes in quality will
be reflected by changes in price. Therefore, the relative importance of each characteristic ai
can be estimated by the regression shown in Eq. (3).
n
P= ao + Z a,Y,+ U
i=1
Qp = a,Y (3)
Hedonic prices have also been equivalently used to measure coefficients in the functional
domain (Xis replace Yis and costs become the response variable instead of price).[36] This
concept was applied to measure communication satellite innovation in a previous
study, [37] the results of which will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. The main
advantage of this market-level approach is that it is more robust to architectural changes
since users are blind to how the particular technical instantiation of a system is as long as it
fulfills their needs.[35] However, because of this level of abstraction from the technological
solution, this approach is less able to provide insights into the nature of the change.
2.2.3 FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE PERSPECTIVE (FPP)
The functional performance perspective strikes a balance between the two extremes,
seeking to measure progress in terms of the system's "essential function". It is a functional
metric in that the measure is tied to the system's technical capabilities, not its market
value; while at the same time a performance metric in that it focuses on what the system
does, rather than how it does it. For example, Ref. [32] uses the broad functional categories
of storage, transformation and transportation to study the time dependence of information
technologies. The empirical example of how the quantity of data stored (O(t)) per cubic
centimeter (I(t)) has increased along a single exponential trajectory, despite transitions
from hand-writing on paper, through magnetic discs to optical drives, is used to illustrate
the point. The functional performance perspective purports to yield insights into the
structure of technology change, without being tied to particular technological artifacts.
2.3 PRECEDENCE FOR QUANTITATIVE ABSTRACTIONS FOR SPACECRAFT
In the context of space systems, approaches to quantitatively comparing the values of
alternative spacecraft architectures have been of central interest in the domain of
tradespace exploration (see Ref. [38] for a review of the major activities). While this
literature does not address the question of how to measure spacecraft innovation directly,
it does tackle a similar task of quantifying constraints (i.e., inputs) and benefits (i.e.,
outputs) for various types of space systems. However, because of the system-of-systems
nature of most space systems, not all inputs and outputs are measured at the same product
level (i.e., the output of a satellite is different from the output of the constellation of
satellites); something that is particularly important to consider when combining inputs and
outputs to measure innovation. This section begins by summarizes the precedence for
quantifying spacecraft systems inputs and outputs separately. Then, it addresses the
implications of the different product levels for combining inputs and outputs to measure
spacecraft innovation.
2.3.1 MEASURES OF INNOVATION OUTPUT
Taking a simplified functional perspective, spacecraft mass is often used as a crude
measure of capability since larger satellites tend to be more complex and more functional.
A more sophisticated measure of innovation output is the Generalized Information
Network Analysis (GINA)[39] methodology. It is conceptually closest to the market
performance perspective; however it incorporates aspects of all three approaches. The
methodology's core contribution was the observation that multiple classes of earth orbiting
satellites are in essence information transfer networks. Specifically, Shaw proposed that
system "quality-of-service" (Qp) can be characterized in terms of four quality parameters:
1) isolation; 2) rate; 3) integrity; and 4) availability. Specifically:
QP = f (Is, r, In, Av) (4)
Abstracting system functionality in this way has been shown to allow the conceptual
designs for thousands of competing communication satellite constellation architectures to
be compared directly.[40] Although the definition is clearly linked to technical
functionality, the abstraction is in terms of value delivered to the user. For example, in the
case of communication satellites, Shaw argues that a suitable metric might be the number
of billable voice-circuit minute, which clearly takes an economic impact perspective.
However, focusing solely on the information transfer aspect of Eq. (4), the concept is quite
similar to that proposed in ref [32]. The performance of the information transfer network
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is based on the link's usability over some fixed duration, in this case, capacity over useful
life. A simplified version of Eq. (5) can be expressed as:
Qp = C x Tuserful (5)
As with other functional performance metrics (FPMs), Eq. (5) is sufficiently abstract to
compare architecturally diverse communication satellites, but is still tied to technological
progress.
More recently, Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE)[41] has extended the
concept of abstracting design differences along the dimension of user-centric performance,
to compare a wider range of satellite architectures (see for example application to space-
based radar[42, 43]). Where the GINA abstraction contends that increases in functionality
only improve satellite performance in so far as they improve information transfer, MATE
leverages insights from multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT)[44] to integrate multiple
"essential" performance attributes, similar to the technology-function perspective. It uses a
quality function deployment (QFD) matrix to relate design parameters to performance
attributes, simplifying the numerical analysis required to find SOA trade-off surfaces by
relying on the experience of the designer. Technical parameters (specified in the
functional-domain) enumerate the rows, and user attributes (specified in the performance-
domain) head the columns. The impact of each parameter on each attribute is then
specified. In this way, the performance gain associated with changes in functionality can be
examined directly. [45]
2.3.2 MEASURES OF INNOVATION INPUT
In engineering design, cost is the traditional measure of input constraints. While monetary
constraints are certainly critical, and it can be argued that all other constraints can be
converted to cost-impacts anyway, there may be times when the consideration of other
constraints is appropriate and necessary. For example, measurements of lifetime costs,
which include ground systems, the complete on-orbit constellation, operating and launch
costs, capture a complete monetary constraint. However, when examining historical trends
as will be done in this paper, it may not be possible to consider the entire system. In that
case, care will need to be taken to include non-monetary constraints as appropriate. For
example, launch services, in addition to representing a significant upfront cost, play an
important role in the topological definition of on orbit assets in the satellite system
network. The choice of launcher will constrain available mass and volume, impacting
system design, leading to important implications for cost baselines (see ref [46] for an
evaluation of cost impacts on launch choices). If the cost of launch choices is included as an
input to the innovation metric, then constraint parameters like mass and volume are
internalized as intermediary details. However, if product scope does not include the choice
of launch vehicle these constraints must be accounted for in some other way. This could be
accomplished as suggested in Eq. (6):
I(t) = cLifetime = f(csatenlite, Launchconstraints, Opsconstraints) (6)
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In Eq. (6), the constraint imposed by the launcher could be captured by the launch mass;
the implicit assumption being that some launch trade-off decision has already been made
and the result constrains the design primarily through mass restrictions. Similarly
decisions about ground stations and operations can be internalized through appropriate
definition of the input and output. For example, a satellite designed to communicate via a
maritime receiver would require more power and beam precision, for the same quality of
data link, as a lesser satellite communicating with a land-based receiver. In this case, only
including the satellite-side of the communication link in the performance will give a crude
accounting for ground-side trades.
2.3.3 THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATING INPUT AND OUTPUT MEASURES AS A CONSISTENT
METRIC (I/O)
Measures of input and output have been commonly integrated through metrics like cost
per function (e.g., Ref. [39]). CPF is nominally a measure of the level of innovation per Eq.
(1), since cost is a suitable I(t) and number of satisfied users is a user-domain measure of
0(t). However, it cuts across the performance-function split defined in section 2.2.
Following ref [47], while related, cost and price are measured from different points of
view. Cost is a measure used in the design space and is calculated as a role-up of
constituent subsystem costs. Price, on the other hand, is observed in the user space and is a
measure of the customer's willingness to pay for a set of performance attributes. Thus, if a
performance metric, like "number of satisfied users" sits in the user-space then it should be
normalized by price (the monetary user-space constraint) rather than cost. In addition to
matching the performance and functional perspectives, the level of product must also align.
In the above example, since "number of satisfied users" is a satellite service output, the
relevant price should also be a price for service (and not, for example, the price paid to
launch a single satellite). Section 3 examines the dimensions of market and product, in
combination, to define useful input-output measurement paradigms.
3 DEVELOPING A COMSAT INNOVATION METRIC
As described above, there are multiple ways to define the innovation inputs and outputs
required to implement Eq. (1). Metrics that split along the market dimension, from those
focusing on the structure of the technological knowledge, to those considering only the
impact of changes in the market were described. However, when the precedence for
spacecraft metrics was explored, it became apparent that a second dimension, to capture
the levels of product scope, was needed as well. This section defines three boundary
paradigms, within the market-product space, that make sense for communication satellites.
Initially it defines an idealized input-output metric for each without regard for data
availability issues. Then it revisits the metrics with consideration of implementation
realities.
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3.1 IDEALIZED METRIc DEVELOPMENT
Setting aside the constraints associated with collecting historical satellite data for a
moment, the spectrum of potential communication satellite input-output boundary
definitions are illustrated in Figure Sabc. While the enterprise level goal of communication
satellite development is to deliver service to the user, multiple transactions occur along the
path to delivering that service, each with a definable and potentially boundable input and
output Thus, if innovation measures change in input and output over time, as long as one is
careful about the boundary definition (and completeness of the cut), innovation can be
"tracked" at any level. The sections that follow define three potential communication
satellite boundary definitions and their corresponding inputs and outputs.
A. Satellite Communication B. Physical Satellite C. Communication Service
Enterprise
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considers the satellite acquirer to be both buyer (of the physical system) and seller (of the
communication service) simultaneously, as shown in Figure 5a. Following the GINA
abstraction described above, the key insight here is that the physical satellite has value to
its buyer only in so far as it provides the information transfer service desired by the end
user. The relevant measure of output is then captured by Eq. (5) specified above:
0(t) = Qp = C x Tuserru - (7a)
where capacity should be a measure of billable voice circuits (or equivalent) and life is a
measure of the satellite's useful life. As a buyer of the physical system, the corresponding
input measure is the price paid for the physical system. However, since the physical
satellite is being acquired as part of a larger enterprise, other constraints imposed by the
overall architecture should be incorporated as inputs as well:
I(t) =f(Psat, p,..., 13N) (7b)
whr aaiysol eamasr4fblal1oc icis o qiaet n iei
3.1.2 PHYSICAL SATELLITE
The second definition of system boundary - the physical satellite - considers the
transaction between the satellite manufacturer and acquiring enterprise as shown in
Figure 5b. Taking the perspective of the satellite manufacturer, it is appropriate to measure
inputs and outputs in the design space. Then, innovation can be observed as changes in the
cost to produce a normalized level of functionality. The relevant measure of output is then
captured as a trade-off surface in subsystem functions:
0(t) = QF =fa1,...,an, X1,...,Xn) (8a)
And the input is simply a measure of the cost to produce that functionality:
I(t) = csat (8b)
3.1.3 COMMUNICATION SERVICE
The third definition of system boundary - the communication service - considers the
transaction between the system user and satellite service providers, as shown in Figure 5.
The user, in this case an individual or group requiring the ability to communicate
information from one point to another, inputs money (in the form of a fee for service) in
return for the output of service (some quantity of communication minutes at an acceptable
quality level). In this case, the nature of the system that makes this communication possible
is irrelevant to the user, except in so far as it detracts from the communication. Framed this
way, the GINA abstraction is directly applicable and innovation can be observed as changes
in the price to receive some nominal level of service. Specifically, the input and output to
Eq. (1) are thus:
0(t) = Qp =f (Is, r, In, Av) (9a)
I(t) = Pservice (9b)
3.2 PRACTICAL SURROGATES GIVEN EMPIRICAL CONSTRAINTS
For innovation trends to have value for analysts and decision makers, they must be based
on empirical measures of historical programs. In the preceding section, data issues were
alluded to, but the emphasis was on conceptual challenges to measuring innovation. Now,
consideration must be given to the realities of working with historical data. In this section,
data collection issues for historical satellite programs are discussed, and next best
parameter equivalents (i.e., surrogates) are proposed. Since all three boundary paradigms
identified above split the metrics between monetary, quality-of-service and time measures,
the discussion is split that way here too.
25
3.2.1 INPUT DATA ISSUES: HISTORICAL COSTS AND PRICES
Conceptually, the cost element of trending innovation is straightforward: discount all costs
to some baseline time and compare them directly. In this paper, all monetary Fig.s are
reported in millions of 2005 USD, adjusted using the NASA deflator as published on the
"NASA Cost Estimating Websitel". It is the practical aspect of collecting historical cost data
that is difficult. Cost data, the money spent to produce the spacecraft, is typically restricted
due to its proprietary nature. Although certain government contracts require the
disclosure of cost data, the sample size is quite small and does not provide a sufficiently
large cross-section to abstract industry trends.
In the absence of true cost data, there are two candidate surrogates: cost models and
historical price data. While there are a number of relatively mature cost estimating tools
currently available (see for example, the NASA Advanced Missions Cost Model (AMCM)),
they are not suitable as a surrogate for empirical costs. The models are designed to aid
engineering managers in predicting future program costs, based on key design parameters
and assumptions regarding typical rates of progress in the industry. Thus, their outputs
effectively "beg the question" with respect to empirically measuring innovation.
Nonetheless, analysis of AMCM predictions can provide valuable insight into NASA's
assumptions concerning the rate of technological progress in the space sector..
Historical price data, the money spent to purchase a finished spacecraft, like cost data, is
quite difficult to collect. While price data, at least for government contracts, are in principle,
publicly available, there is no formal centralized record system, making complete data sets
difficult to come by. However, the results of 40 year's worth of collection effort are housed
in the Communication Satellite Database (CSD), published yearly by TelAstra Inc[48]. The
CSD's primary sources of data are publications in the open literature, supplemented by
informal interviews and engineering common knowledge. It is the most comprehensive
collection of satellite price data that the authors could find, containing data on several
thousand satellites launched since 1965. While this data set is sufficiently large to provide
insight into industry trends, the question remains whether price is an appropriate
surrogate for cost.
There is a fundamental difference between the meanings of cost and price. Cost is a
measure of the aggregate costs of developing and manufacturing the constituent parts,
where price is a reflection of the market's willingness to pay for the functional capabilities
of the product. Specifically:
c= 2 cpf,
P= f(ai,..., an, Y,.., Y)
Poc c (10)
1 http://cost.jsc.nasa.gov/models.htm the downloadable Excel file is based on OMB data collected in 2003
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In a "normal" competitive market, the relationship between these two quantities can be
extremely non-linear; however, the market for satellites is not competitive on the buy-side.
In fact, there is typically only one buyer with a pre-specified willingness to pay. Combined
with strict acquisition regulations, a nominally proportionate relationship between satellite
cost and price emerges as shown in Eq. (10). Thus, in this context, price is an appropriate
surrogate for cost.
ct P~ P nt (11
It is worth clarifying that the above discussion is concerned only with satellite costs and
prices. The distinction has little relevance for service prices. For the communication service
paradigm, price paid by the user for a minute of service (MoS) is the relevant monetary
metric and could be collected as a historical record of prices charged by service providers
at different points in history. This data is not contained in the CSD referenced above.
3.2.2 OUTPUT DATA ISSUES: SURROGATES FOR FUNCTIONALITY AND PERFORMANCE
Where historical costs are difficult to collect at all, some level of technical data is generally
available. The trouble is getting enough of the right data to estimate each of the metrics
defined in section 3. This is particularly challenging in the performance domain because
published specifications tend to list technical parameters relevant to designers, rather than
service attributes relevant to end users. While the technical parameter data are suitable
for the calculation of function as needed for the Physical Satellite analysis, data from which
performance attributes can be derived are need for both the Communication Service and
Communication Satellite Enterprise analyses.
The CSD contains technical data, including satellite mass, power, design life for most
programs, and number of transponders, transmission frequency (e.g., C, Ku, Ka) as well as
Effective Isotropic Radiated Power (EIRP) for some. Thus a functional trade-off surface
could be calculated as proposed in Eq. (2) to implement Eq. (9a); however, since trade-off
surfaces are extremely difficult to derive, and none currently exists for communication
satellites, following Ref.[36], a weighted, linear combination of sub functions will be
assumed: Specifically:
n
QF= Z aX,
1=1 (12)
The CSD does not contain any parameters from which capacity can be derived directly.
Since capacity is critical to the measure of both the performance metrics specified in Eqs
(8a, 10a), for the richness of the price information in the database data to be harnessed, an
understanding of the relationship between the subsystem functional parameters contained
in the data base and the key system level performance attribute of capacity must be
established. This task is accomplished using a small subset of Intelsat technical details, for
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the period 1965-1995[49], for which capacity data was available. In effect, a parameter is
sought that closely mirrors the capacity trend over time.
Figure 6 shows how each candidate parameter compares to capacity. It can be seen that
while none of these functional parameters alone captures the capacity trend in more recent
years, power tracks capacity most closely and for the longest time. Although this statement
is not rigorous in a statistical sense, given the limited data, such an analysis would be
inappropriate. The candidate parameter trends and their appropriateness as estimators of
capacity can, however, be explained and justified in engineering terms when viewed in the
context of historical satellite development. In Figure 6, it can be seen that both mass and
power track the capacity trend initially. However, where the mass trend has remained
relatively constant over time,2 both the power and capacity increase significantly after
1975. Power continues to track capacity until 1985 when capacity shows a second steep
increase. These two points of divergence correspond to important architectural changes.
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Figure 6 Comparison of Functional Parameters to Capacity Time Trend
2 This is not surprising since the engineering cost estimating community views mass as a rule-of-thumb estimator of
cost.
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In general terms, the functional capability of a communication satellite can be improved,
either by increasing 1) the transmit power, or 2) by using the available power more
efficiently. With regard to the first point of divergence, early communication satellites were
spin stabilized and as a result possessed a limited de-spun area upon which to mount
directionally sensitive equipment (e.g., solar panels, antennas). This meant that
communication power (and by implication capacity) was effectively limited in proportion
to satellite mass. With the advent of 3-axis stabilization, this relationship was
fundamentally changed; large solar panels could now be deployed thereby significantly
increasing the attainable transmit power for a satellite of a given mass. In the Intelsat
series (shown in Figure 6) the switch from spin to 3-axis stabilization occurred between
Intelsat IV-A (1975) and Intelsat V (1980);[49] the point of divergence between the mass
and power trends. Second, the divergence of capacity from power after 1985 can be
understood in terms of more efficient use of bandwidth; Intelsat VII was the first of the
series to employ frequency re-use techniques. [49]
Thus, it is to be expected that as onboard processing becomes increasingly sophisticated
and the relative importance of available power decreases, the gap between satellite power
and capacity will increase. Nonetheless, available power remains a highest-lower-bound
estimator of satellite capacity and the best of the available CSD parameters. There is
certainly room for improvement with more compete technical data. However, in the
absence of a large set of satellite capacity data, the surrogate:
C ~ WSat (13)
is proposed as a highest-lower-bound estimator. While the power metric cannot capture
advances in the domain of beam re-use and power efficiency, it does provide a useful basis
upon which to compare the capability level of architecturally different communication
satellites.
3.2.3 THE DIMENSION OF TIME
In the above discussion, the dimension of time has only been treated implicitly. Time is the
dimension along which innovation is observable; in order to measure a difference, the
normalized level of capability must be attached to a specific time in history. Is it therefore,
more appropriate to consider the contract award date, the launch date or the projected end
of life? If the intervals between these project milestones were relatively constant, the
choice wouldn't matter. However, they are not; and the relative planned differences have
design and cost implications. In order to standardize measurements, contract award date
was chosen as the fixture for capability in history since the state-of-the-art is effectively
frozen at that point in the design life. Design life will be used as the measure of longevity
since actual operational life is an infeasible measure when many of the satellites under
study have not yet been decommissioned.
Tuserful T (14)
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3.3 SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL SURROGATES TO THE CONCEPTUAL MEASUREMENT
APPROACHES
In section 3.1, three boundary paradigms were identified; they are the communication
satellite enterprise, the physical satellite and the communication service. The conceptual
trade-offs involved in their measurement were discussed and the measurement
approaches they imply developed conceptually. In section 3.2, the practical constraints to
measurement, imposed primarily by data availability, were discussed and surrogate
estimators were proposed; final details of the implementation will be worked out in the
sections that follow. As shown in Table 1, each of the product boundary paradigms is
amenable to a different type of metric as defined in section 2.2 and 2.3. The communication
satellite enterprise paradigm takes a functional performance perspective (FPP) to specify a
performance per price (PPP) metric. The physical satellite paradigm takes a technology
functional perspective (TFP) to specify a function per cost (FPC) metric. Finally, the
communication service paradigm takes a market performance perspective (MPP) to specify
a performance per price (PPP) metric.
Table 1 Summary of Communication Satellite O(t)/I(t) Metrics
Product Boundary Ideal Surrogate
Communication Satellite CX TUseffil /(PSat 3 N) Wst x T/ Pcontract
Enterprise (FPP-PPP)
Physical Satellite ffaL...,an Xi.Xn)/csat ZaXi/Pcontact
(TFP-FPC)
Sevic MPP-nPP) f(Is, r, In, Av) / Pservice MoS / Pservice
4 IMPLEMENTING THE METRICS
The conceptual (section 3.1) and practical (section 3.2) challenges associated with
measuring innovation having been addressed, this section illustrates how calculations can
be performed under each of the three boundary paradigms summarized in Table 1; namely,
the communication satellite enterprise, the physical satellite and the communication service.
In all cases, the analysis is generated from data on 350 satellite programs spanning 42
years from 1964 to 2006 and compared to previous analysis where available. The 350
communication programs represent the maximum useable set of data in the
Communications Satellite Databases (CSD). Programs were filtered based on completeness
of data; specifically, data on contract award year, end of life power, operating life, dry mass
and contract award price were required. In cases where multiple satellites were purchased
under a single contract, the award price was simply divided by the number of satellites.
Although this relatively crude approximation does not account for any economies of scale,
3 For a list of the subset of database programs used, please contact the authors directly.
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particularly with respect to the upfront development cost associated with a new design, it
is sufficient for our purposes4 .
4.1 COMMUNICATION SATELLITE ENTERPRISE
Substituting the surrogate metric proposed in Table 1 into Eq. (1), innovation in the
communication satellite enterprise paradigm can be represented as:
. d[O(t)1 d [WxT
dt I(t) J dt 'on~t 1 (15)
Figure 7 shows the trend that results, both as a moving average and a regression line, when
the ratio in Eq. (15) is applied to the CSD data set and plotted over time. The y-axis has
units of watt-years per million dollars. It should not be inferred that these are the units of
innovation. Innovation, as it has been defined in this paper, is a heuristic that has meaning
in a relative sense. Given that power represents a surrogate for the basic capability of a
communication satellite, and that efficiency of power usage has increased over time, the
positive trend in Figure 7 suggests that innovation is occurring in the communication
satellites sector.
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' The analysis in ref. [471 J. H. Saleh, J. P. Torres-Padilla, D. E. Hastings, and D. J. Newman, "To Reduce or to
Extend a Spacecraft Design Lifetime?," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, vol. 43, pp. 207-217, 2006. suggests that
returns to scale are insignificant in this industry
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It is worth noting the extent of variation in the individual satellites' level of innovation for
any given year. Also, that the spread of this variation is increasing in time. This suggests
that while the average capability baseline appears to be increasing over time, other non-
temporal factors impact innovation. This variation may in part be attributable to
limitations of the proposed estimator, but is also likely indicative of real variations in the
intended performance of various satellite programs. Further analysis is required to address
this variation, but it should be apparent how the results presented in Figure 7 create a
basis for such an exploration.
4.2 PHYSICAL SATELLITE
Substituting the surrogate metric proposed in Table 1 into Eq. (1), innovation in the
physical satellite enterprise paradigm can be represented as:
O(t) _. d (16)
dt I(t) dt Pcontrct
In order to implement this metric, with the data contained in the CSD, the weights ai in the
numerator must be estimated. To do this, section 2 offers two approaches. First, following
ref [36], the hedonic price method can be used as described by Eq. (3). This approach was
previously employed to measure technology change in communication satellites in Ref.
[37] using the 1992 version of the CSD. After fitting a communication satellite quality
function per Eq. (3), the historical interval under review was segmented into equal periods
so that a hedonic index of technological progress (TP) could be calculated:
TPQ= ' (17)At,
Ref [37] found evidence of technological progress from one time period to the next.
However, the hedonic price method requires the assumption of commodity product
behavior. Specifically, the method assumes that changes in price are exclusively
attributable to changes in useful functionality. Ref [37] argues that communication
satellites can be treated as commodities because satellite acquirers specify their
willingness to pay for a given functionality a priori. While this characterization ignores
some important complexities associated with the manufacturer-buyer contracting
relationship, without an alternative quality metric, price will be used to generate the
quality function. In the current analysis, the quality function is normalized by price per Eq.
(1) and the history examined continuously (as opposed to calculating a hedonic index) to
facilitate comparison with Figure 7.
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A linear multiple regression of the form:
P = ao + ZaiXi (18)
was used to estimate the parameter weights. All potentially relevant parameters contained
in the CSD were initially included in the regression. Table 2 shows a list of the explanatory
variables found to be statistically significant. Despite high levels of statistical significance
for many of the variables, the overall fit is quite poor, with an R2 of only 0.2409, indicating
that other parameters (not included in the regression) are important in explaining satellite
price (as would be expected of a non-commodity product). Figure 8 plots the evolution of
the ratio specified by Eq. (16), using the regression output in Table 2, over time. The overall
trend is marginally positive. However, since the variation about the mean is obviously non-
uniform, a better weighting function is likely needed to improve this metric. The MATE [45]
approach (described in section II) could provide an alternative to the hedonic price quality
surrogate by weighting the importance of technical parameters according to their impact
on user utility. However, this would require a representative user for all historical
communication satellites to be defined.
Table 2 Results of Multiple Regression on Satellite Price
Parameter Description ai p-value
Constant Intercept term 4456.74 0.0210
AE/O Dummy variable, 1 if customer is based in N America or EU 22.795 0.0393
G/N Dummy variable, 1 if customer is a government agency 54.789 0.0000
Y Year in which initial contract was signed -2.219 0.0233
M Mass of satellite without fuel 0.017 0.0414
Tr Total number of primary transponders -0.455 0.0395
%Ka Percentage of transponders operating in Ka-band 120.02 0.0003
X Dummy variable, 1 if 3-axis stabilized 42.386 0.0033
End of life power (EOLP), design life, %C-band and %Ku-band were also included but found not to be
significant at the 5% level. There may be issues of multicolinearity (particularly in terms of EOLP and
DRYMAS) but they should not affect the regression coefficient for AWDATE.
An alternative to using price to estimate the quality weights (as above) lies in the
engineering rule of thumb that communication satellite mass is a surrogate for
functionality. This approximation can be used to simplify Eq. (16). Specifically,
implementing Eq. (16) becomes an examination of how the mass per million dollars ratio
has evolved over time. When this metric is applied to the CSD, the trend shown in Figure 8.
results. Figure 8 is more similar to Figure 7 than Figure 8 in that the increasing trend is
quite clear; however, like Figure 8, the strength of the trend is quite weak. This difference
may be a function of the particular surrogates being used, or it may be related to the
difference in paradigm; exploring this further may be a fruitful area for future analysis.
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4.3 COMMUNICATION SERVICE
Substituting the surrogate metric proposed in Table 1 into Eq. (1), innovation in the
communication service paradigm can be represented as:
d O(t)1 _ d MoS1
dt I(t) J d LPsevce 1 (19)
This metric could be implemented by plotting the ratio of prices, charged by service
providers, per minute of normalized service, at different points in history. The authors
currently do not have a dataset suitable for such an analysis but believe it to be a
worthwhile avenue for future work. In addition, since the hedonic pricing assumptions are
respected in the communication service paradigm (communication service users are
indifferent to where the signal comes from) a more representative quality metric could be
derived using hedonic regression.
5 COMPARISON OF THE THREE APPROACHES
The preceding sections have illustrated three approaches to conceptualizing and
empirically measuring innovation for communication satellites. They are based on system
boundary definitions which slice the measurement problem along the dimensions of
market and product. As long as the implementations of the metrics are internally
consistent, the three metrics should be equally capable of measuring communication
satellite innovation. However, they yield insights into different aspects of the innovation
process. Further, as a result of the significant constraint imposed by the lack of wide
availability of historical data, simplifications needed to be made to the idealized
conceptualizations. In section 4, these simplifications, and the nature of the available data,
led to a mapping of each paradigm to a particular implementation methodology. While the
paradigms need not be linked to these methodologies in general, in the context of this
paper, the integrity of each methodology is strongly connected to the strength of the
results. As a result, since the goal of this paper is to lay the foundation for future analysis of
the drivers of innovation in the space sector, an assessment of the methods is of central
interest.
Where section 4 focused on the mechanics of implementing the metrics proposed in section
3, this section assess the utility of the results in facilitating future analysis of historical
trends in communication satellite innovation. Specifically, this section asks the questions:
Given limitations in data availability and our ability to conceptualize capability for various
types of systems, which method provides the most useful basis upon which to compare
historically diverse programs over time? This question has two main parts. The first
queries the validity of each method's representation of point-innovation levels and the
second queries the relative utility of the methods as a basis for future discussion and
quantitative historical analysis. As such, this section is structured in four parts; the first
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three sections address the validity of the representation for each method and the last part
compares their relative utility.
5.1 COMMUNICATION SATELLITE ENTERPRISE
The communication satellite enterprise paradigm takes a functional performance
perspective (FPP) to specify a performance per price (PPP) metric. As discussed above, this
approach has the potential to combine the advantages of both market- and technology-
based metric. The functional performance is defined at a sufficiently abstract system level
to be comparable across a wide range of architectural instantiations, while remaining
sufficiently connected to the physical system to yield insights into the technological
progress. Thus, further analysis of the data presented in Figure 7 is expected to yield
insights into both the structure of communication satellite technology change, but also
variability in the effectiveness of non-technical (i.e., contract, market, business structure)
factors.
In terms of implementation, of the three approaches, the communication satellite
enterprise metric is the most intuitive; it weighs outcomes versus inputs as a simple ratio.
However, the method is highly contingent on the ability of a domain expert to abstract a
suitable essential enterprise level function for which data is also available. This is
complicated by the fact that the validity of the abstraction relates to the homogeneity of
relevant user needs. As a result, what works well in the tradespace exploration paradigm
may be less effective in historical innovation analysis. Tradespace explorations are
typically performed to evaluate alternative architectures for a particular mission. This has
the effect of reducing the decision space; the question becomes: which architecture best
fulfills the customer-defined objective(s)? making abstractions like GINA [39] and MATE
[45] possible. When the goal is to compare historical missions, on the other hand, the
question is quite different. While each design was presumably tailored to the objectives of
its customer, those objectives may not be consistent across customers and time. Thus,
instead of abstracting based on the stated objectives of the particular customer as in the
tradespace paradigm, when analyzing innovation histories, essential functions must be
identified that normalizes across the objectives of multiple customers.
For the base case of communication satellites, a metric following the GINA abstraction [39]
was shown to be suitable. However, for more complicated spacecraft types it may not be
possible to find a common essential function across a large enough sample size. For
example, how do you compare an imaging satellite designed to take low-resolution, low
refresh-rate images of the polar ice caps to one designed to take frequent, high-resolution
images of troop movement to support military intelligence? With the different
requirements for orbits, optics and pointing accuracy[50] (among other attributes) it
seems like abstracting functionality to information transfer - one proposed essential
function - is overly simplistic. The solution might be to reduce the set of comparison from
"imaging satellites" to "high-resolution, intelligence imaging satellites" but this will result in
smaller sample size and reduced generalizability. Besides the difficulty in defining a
suitable performance metric, the constraint of data availability is no less significant for
imaging satellites than for the case of communication satellites as discussed above.
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Thus, when a suitable functional abstraction can be found and data is attainable, the
satellite enterprise paradigm provides a strong basis for further analysis. However, if other,
more complicated types of satellites are to be studied, this approach may not be
appropriate, unless a method for abstracting user-centric performance can be developed in
general.
5.2 PHYSICAL SATELLITE
The physical satellite paradigm takes a technical function perspective (TFP) to specify a
function per cost (FPC) metric. As discussed above, this approach has the potential to
generate a deep understanding of the structure of technology change in the physical
system. However, in the context of communication satellites, many of the advances in
system performance have been achieved through improved utilization of the system not
changes to the constituent technology. Since the early days of satellite communications, the
general architecture has remained the same - large, bent-pipe, GEO, solar-powered, many
transponders etc... - recent exponential increases in capacity have been achieved through
creative, more efficient, use of the available spectrum (e.g., narrow spot beams and ground
station placement).[51] These types of changes are not observable in the physical satellite
boundary paradigm.
Further, although the parametric regression employed in the physical satellite paradigm
draws a strong footing in the statistics and cost estimation literature, and as a result seems
familiar and intuitive, it requires strong assumptions that may not be appropriate in the
communication context. First, the hedonic assumption that communication satellites
behave as commodity products, is clearly wrong. However, without another more suitable
quality metric, prices were used to estimate the weights of the various technical
parameters. Although this yielded potentially information rich clusters of programs, with
R2s near zero, the validity of the results are suspect. Second, regression based analysis
assumes a true trend and is extremely susceptible to outliers. In the case of spacecraft,
many programs are outliers in that they deviate from any predictable norm, but cannot be
characterized as bad data; they are simply special cases. Nonetheless, these legitimate
outliers can have extremely high leverage on the overall trend.
In addition, the technological capability baseline of components used in multiple spacecraft
subsystems, have increased over time due to factors external to the space industry. As a
result, there are problems of multicollinearity between technical parameters which are
assumed to be independent. Finally, spacecraft are complex socio-technical systems whose
costs and levels of innovation are determined by a multitude of parameters, some of which
aren't measurable at all and many of which have not been recorded in historical datasets.
This leads to low coefficients of determination and high errors. Interestingly, the simplified
heuristic - that mass is a surrogate for satellite functionality - yielded a much higher
coefficient of determination and more homogenous trend, although not as high as in the
communication satellite enterprise paradigm. The same problems of data availability
(discussed in section 5.5.1) apply here; however, this method can naturally be extended to
other spacecraft, assuming access to appropriate technical parameters. Therefore, the
physical satellite paradigm, coupled with variations on the parametric estimation, may be
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the best option in cases where system level metrics per the communication satellite
enterprise paradigm can't be defined and the structure of technology change is of primary
interest.
5.3 COMMUNICATION SERVICE
Given the challenges of collecting cost and service quality data in the space sector, the
prospect of inferring innovation from commodity price fluctuations is extremely exciting.
Since communication services derived from satellites can be viewed as a commodity, many
established analysis techniques become available. In addition, by defining the service as the
product, the difficulties associated with defining a user centric performance are
circumvented; in this case, the service contract makes clear what the user believes they are
paying for. At this point, historical service price data has not been collected for the
communication satellite market; however it is believed to be available and is an important
area of future work. However, it is worth pointing out, that as a market performance
perspective (MPP) on a performance per price (PPP) metric, limited information about the
structure of the technology change can be inferred. This approach will be most useful in
comparing the satellite paradigm to other methods of delivering communication service
and assessing the extent to which satellites can represent a disruptive platform for future
information transfer in the commercial market.
5.4 PICKING A METRIC GOING FORWARD
The three boundary paradigms presented herein each strive to represent the level of
innovation of a diverse set of communication satellite programs developed over the last 50
years. Given limitations in data availability and our ability to conceptualize capability for
various types of systems, the Communication Satellite Service paradigm appears to be the
most promising moving forward. While both of the Communication Satellite Service and
Physical Satellite paradigms, for which the metric was implemented, yield similar results,
the Physical Satellite paradigm required several potentially suspect assumptions to be
made. Further, the Communication Satellite Service paradigm transforms the population of
satellites into a more conducive form for analysis - it nearly eliminates heteroscedacity of
the data, while maintaining a wide spread of variation. However, if a data set, suitable for
implementing with the Communication Service paradigm becomes available, this
conclusion that the communication Satellite Service paradigm yields the best basis for
further analysis should be revisited.
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PART B: INNOVATION LESSONS FROM
COMMUNICATION SATELLITE HISTORY (1964-
2006)
In order to gain insights from historical data effectively, one needs two pieces: first, a
suitable parameter to "track" and second, an analysis approach around which to structure
the investigation. Part A of this thesis addressed the first piece, developing the following
"best" innovation metric for communication satellites:
id[_M]d (t)] d W , xT
dt dt I I(t) _ dt Pontrac (20)
Note that the abbreviation IM (innovation metric) will be used hereafter to refer to the
ratio inside the square brackets.
When the above equation was applied to the Communication Satellite Database, the data
revealed a strong indication (R2=0.7) of exponential growth in the sector's "capability
baseline" overtime. That innovation is occurring, in and of itself, is not surprising; one
would hope that some level of innovation is occurring in an industry whose very mandate
is to push boundaries. What is more interesting, is the extreme variations of individual
program performance around the industry mean, suggesting that other important factors
are at play.
Since the overall goal of this work is to improve the spacecraft innovation process, based
on an increased understanding of what drives innovation in the industry, it is this variation
that must be explained. Part B reports on the next step in this research effort, seeking to
explain this variation. There are two main phases to this work. First, the complementary
strategies of data mining and theory guided exploration are employed to find statistically
significant trends in the data. Second, the historical contexts of the "patterns" are probed in
an effort to match theory to practice.
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6 IDENTIFYING KEY EXPLANATORY PARAMETERS
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to identifying trends in historical data: straight
data mining and theory-based exploration. Data mining is the umbrella term for the
process of extracting hidden trends from data. It requires no concept of what the trends
should look like a priori, to be effective [52]; however, when theory does exist, it can
reduce the search space and may improve the quality of the results.[53] The latter
approach is sometimes called theory-based data exploration. This section describes how
data mining techniques were used initially, and later refined with theory-based exploration
to refine the baseline model of spacecraft innovation presented in Part A.
6.1 METHOD 1: DATA MINING
Data mining typically proceeds in three phases.[54, 55] First the data is pre-processed,
which involves identifying a suitable dataset, removing observations that are noisy or
absent and organized into feature vectors (i.e., a vector of parameters corresponding to
each observation). This process was described, vis-a-vis the Communication Satellite
Database, in section 4. Second, the data is mined. This typically involves some combination
of classification,5 clustering6, regression7 and association rule learning.8 Finally, the results
are interpreted for practical validity.
6.1.1 ANALYZING THE DATA
A linear regression model of the form:
ln(IM) = cco + a1Xi+... + a2Xn (21)
was selected for the analysis because it allows for a continuum of responses and makes the
least assumptions about the structure of the data (i.e., level of spacecraft innovation).9
Backwards step-wise selection [53] was used to reduce the model. The regression output
is summarized in Table 3. The results indicate that multiple parameters are statistically
significant; nonetheless, including the significant factors in the regression generates only a
relatively minor improvement in the overall fit (from R2 = 0.7 to 0.72).
s Classification seeks to predict the membership of a particular observation in some predefined group
6 Groups similar observations without prior assumptions regarding structure
7 Regression analysis attempts to fit a function which models the response variable while minimizing "least-
squared" error.
8 Searches for hidden relationships between variables
9 Both Clustering and Classification assume that the response variables fall into discrete categories (e.g., an e-mail is
either legitimate or spam). This doesn't make sense when the response is "level of spacecraft innovation" which
falls on a continuum from low to high. Association Rule Learning could potentially yield interesting insights, but is
extraneous to the objective of identifying key explanatory parameters (it is more relevant to the follow-on task of
exploring their interactions).
40
Table 3 Results of Multiple Linear Regression on the Innovation Metric
Parameter Description Xi p-value
Constant Intercept term -105.32 0.000
Awdate Date of contract award (time) 0.054 0.000
Arch Dummy variable denoting stabilization method (spin vs 3-axis s atsp-valueArh stabilized; 0/1) 0infiat05vau
Dummy variable used to differentiate between customers
Location located in the "west" (i.e., N. America and Europe) and the rest of 0.1147 0.006
the world (0/1)
Org Dummy variable used to differentiate between government and -0.1390 0.005
non-government customers
Type Dummy variable for "firm fixed" versus "cost-plus" contracts 0.0632 0.019
6.1.2 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
The metric defined in Part A frames innovation in its technical and economic context,
measuring how the cost of achieving a particular level of functionality changes over time.
However, even if the innovation metric could perfectly express the capability level of a
particular satellite, one would not expect all the data points to fall exactly on the trend line.
Two factors that might contribute to this deviation are generational shifts and contract
structure. While in the aggregate, innovation may appear as a steady, incremental,
exponential growth, there is strong evidence that technological change proceeds as a
combination of incremental steps and radical leaps (see for example ref. [22, 56]). This
generational discontinuity is why the familiar patterns of sequential s-curves exist. In the
regression analysis, Arch, is the primary indicator of generational discontinuity. The other
factor - contract structure - is relevant because real markets do not operate at perfect
economic equilibrium. As a result, characteristics of the particular product development
and transaction can influence its level of innovation achieved, relative to the expected. In
the regression analysis, Location, Org and Type are three examples of contract parameters.
The results in Table 3 indicate that three of the contractual parameters are statistically
significant, while none of the generational parameters were.
6.1.2.1 Significance of Contractual Parameters - Limitation of the Coding
On first pass, it might seem strange that three contractual parameters are significant but
barely improve the regression model (compared to the baseline time regression performed
in Part A). This result is likely a byproduct of the granularity of the coding; namely,
categorizing customers as broadly as "all American or European non-government firms" is
not much better than customers in general. This does not mean that no customer category
would improve the metric. Thus finer categories will be examined in Method 2: Theory-
based Exploration.
6.1.2.2 Insignificance of the Generational Parameters - Removing the Time Dependence
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The insignificance of the generational parameter is surprising, since the phenomenon of
sequential "s-curves" is well established (see for example ref [23]). However, the
communication satellite industry has not experienced major waves of creative
destruction[28] as in other industries, in part because of the significant government
involvement in the early stages and stable oligopoly of system integrators. As a result, the
dominant design[26] of 3-axis stabilized, large, geostationary satellites emerged quite
quickly and wasn't replaced until the relatively recent emergence of low earth orbit (LEO)
constellations. However, limitations of the innovation metric (described in more detail in
ref Part A) result in a limited ability to value the utility of constellations. Thus, the
generational investigation is limited to the change from spin-stabilized to 3-axis stabilized
architectures.
Figure 10 illustrates the statistical result of no difference. Although there is clearly a
difference between the trend line for spin- and 3-axis-stabilized satellites, satellites in the
spin category do not fall outside the expected range of innovation level for the given year.
Further, a single exponential fit (R2 = 0.694) is slightly better than the combination of two
separate fits for the different generations. While one could argue that this is a case where
statistical significance is not a good practical measure, this result does justify exploring the
advantages of examining the data as a single generation.
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contained in the communication satellite database is both time-series (spanning
of history) and cross-sectional (including many different types of programs in
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each year). Innovation occurs over time, but is driven by cross-sectional difference.
Although 350 data points may seems like a large number, there are relatively few cross-
sectional points in any one year. Thus, since it is relative innovative performance that is of
interest from a strategic point of view, the cross-sectional richness of the data-set can be
increased by removing the time trend (and thereby standardizing the data). Figure 11 plots
innovation level as a difference from the industry mean; it is equivalent to Figure 7 with the
time trend-line subtracted out.
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Figure 11 Deviations from the Industry Innovation Mean
The idea is that the capability baseline of the industry is improving in general (i.e.,
improvements in power electronics and processor capability should not be attributed
directly to any communication satellite project), but some types of projects will
consistently do better or worse than that mean. And, if the industry baseline is removed,
characteristics of an above average project in, for example, 1970 can be compared directly
to an equally above average project in 2000, thus increasing the number of projects that
can be compared. The relatively equal spread from the 1960s to the 2010s seen in Figure
11 demonstrates that this assumption is valid in principle. However, this approach
implicitly assumes that a single, consistent increase in the industry capability baseline has
occurred over time. As discussed above, this assumption is likely invalid in general for most
industries because of generational discontinuities. However, in the context of
communication satellites, where the overall architecture has remained relatively constant
for most of its history, and there is no statistical difference between the generations, the
gains in cross-sectional richness appear to justify the trade.
6.2 METHOD 2: THEORY-BASED EXPLORATION
In the previous section, an effort was made to associate different levels of innovation
performance with top-level categories of program type (e.g., American, commercial
programs). However, while the categories were found to be statistically significant, in
practical terms, the differentiation was too coarse to be useful. In this section, a more
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detailed, bottom-up approach is taken. Expected patterns are hypothesized based on
theory, to be proved or disproved by the data.
6.2.1 EXPECTED TRENDS: HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION
Characteristics of the space market (with its monopsony-oligopoly structure and complex
robust products) constrain the ability for transaction dynamics (i.e., the continuous
interaction of user needs and seller capabilities) to generate innovation naturally. As a
result, where the strategic innovation management literature tends to prescribe ways in
which firms and regulators can catalyze, and/or benefit from, dynamics that must exist (see
for example [23, 26]), the goal in the space sector is fundamentally different. Institutional
acquisition agencies (e.g., DoD acquisition core, NASA) exist in part to correct for market
failures; and thus each of their goals is more to restore a broken dynamic than to
strengthen a naturally occurring one. Ref. [14] examines how challenges imposed by the
space market structure are corrected for, with varying degrees of success, by the DoD
acquisition structure. Ref. [57] performs a similar analysis for the case of the European
Space Agency (ESA). In this section, insights gained through that work are leveraged to
develop historical "experiments" which can be conducted using the cross-section of
program configurations captured in the data in Figure 11.
This paper will not dwell on the underlying theory (see ref. [14] for a more detailed
treatment), but a brief background is required to motivate the competing research
hypotheses. In the most basic sense, the continuous interaction of user -needs and seller -
capabilities are thought to drive innovation.[58] In a competitive market, both are revealed
completely through the mechanism of price.[59] However, in the monopsony-oligopoly
market of space, this information transfer is limited in two ways. Firstly, a monopsony
market is discrete and specific since the market only exists when the buyer wants to buy
and, as a result, user needs must be specified explicitly since there is no aggregate behavior
from which they can be inferred. Further, in the stable oligopoly that exists on the space
sector sell-side, there is little incentive for contractors to invest in innovation on their own;
they tend to innovate in response to government requests. Based on these constraints, one
might expect that innovation in the space sector is dominated by a top-down specified
innovation; namely, the customer defines a sufficiently advanced need and contractors are
compelled to innovate just to fulfill the contract. In the historical data, this would manifest
as a high correlation between level of relative innovation and particular customers (who
are smart buyers).
HYPOTHESIS 1: Customer main effects will show a strong correlation
with innovation performance.
However, this expectation of user-specified innovation presumes that customers are
capable of defining the "right" level of advanced specification to drive innovation
independently. The task of determining what the best next step vis-a-vis innovation is, for a
complex product like a spacecraft, requires the integration of multiple knowledge areas. On
the capability side, both a detailed knowledge of the components and their linkages (i.e.,
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architectural innovation[24]) is required. However, these areas of expertise are fragmented
among system integrators, major subsystem contractors and component suppliers. On the
need side, a trade-off must be made between operational desires and budgetary priorities.
For example, in the DoD, these areas of expertise are divided between warfighters and
congress respectively. As a result, in addition to expecting differences in the ability of
customers to represent their needs, there is also a need for contractors to participate in
defining the frontier of the possible. Although the nature of this relationship may vary
under different circumstances, one would expect the existence of a relationship to facilitate
the necessary transfer of information but at the same time limit the incentives to take risks.
In the historical data, this would manifest as a high correlation between level of relative
innovation and particular customer-contractor pairs.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Interaction effects will dominate the main effects in
predicting innovation performance.
There is a third competing expectation. Given that contractors possess the detailed
technical knowledge on which innovations are built, they are in the best position to initiate
innovation. However, as discussed above they have limited incentives to do so because of
their stable and powerful market position. That being said, there is still an advantage to
favorably differentiating oneself from the competition, and prestige to be gained from
being involved with successful, highly public projects. In addition, through repeated
development efforts, contractors accumulate the complementary assets and tacit expertise
which facilitate innovation.[60] Therefore it would not be unexpected to detect a difference
among contractors vis-A'-vis innovation. In the historical data, this would manifest as a high
correlation between level of relative innovation and particular contractors.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Contractor main effects will show strong correlation
with innovation performance.
6.2.2 OBSERVED TRENDS: ANALYSIS
Viewed together, the theory suggests that much of the variation in innovation level can be
attributed to differences in customers, contractors and the relationship that emerges when
they work together. Thus we expect a relationship of the form:
IM - a0 - alt = EMcusti(t) + EMconti (t) + EEIcuiconj(t) (22)
where the terms on the right side of the equation denote the impact of each factor.
Hypothetically, a full factorial experiment could be designed to measure each of these
factors using an n-factor ANOVA. Particular customers and contractors would randomly be
paired to develop satellites over time. You would want every customer to work with every
contractor at different (and multiple) points in history. Clearly, such an experiment is not
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feasible to conduct in practice; however the data captured in Figure 11 show the results of
a 42 year natural experiment, whereby particular customers and contractors have actually
paired to develop satellites. Thus, similar analysis can be done on the results of this so-
called quasi-experiment.
However, unlike in a designed experiment, the experiment cannot simply be re-run to fill in
missing historical data points. Not surprisingly, the history of communication satellite
development does not respect the full factorial design (i.e., not every contractor worked
with every customer and definitely not multiple times over time). As a result, ANOVA
analysis cannot be applied directly. Instead, the main effects (i.e., the effect of each of the
customers and contractors independently) are analyzed separately and then the interaction
effects (i.e., the additional effect of each customer contractor pairs) for a reduced sample are
layered on top. In the analysis that follows, customers and contractors are defined as the
buyer and seller as listed on the satellite contract. Where a particular firm has changed
names, all instances were grouped as the same customer/contractor (e.g, HAC, HSC, BSC
and BSS are all listed as Boeing), but where a company was purchased, broken up and
"repackaged," the multiple instantiations are kept separate.
6.2.2.1 Customer Main Effects: Does the expected high correlation between levels of
relative innovation and particular customers (who are smart buyers) exist?
In order to assess whether there is a statistically significant difference between customers,
pair-wise t-tests were performed on the difference between each mean (at the 95%
confidence level)10; the Tukey method was used to account for multiple comparisons.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show a summary of the data." Figure 12 highlights the data points
associated with three customers in particular, demonstrating that while each customer
shows considerable variations in innovation levels over time, there is no consistent
increasing or decreasing trend in time. Thus the mean innovation level of each customer
can be compared without considering additional time effects. Figure 13 shows a box plot of
all the comparisons, which yielded an overall F(11,84)-statistic of 5.8 which corresponds to a
p-value of 0.0000. This provides strong statistical evidence that the satellites contracted by
at least one customer (in this case the US DoD as indicated in red in Figure 12) are
systematically different from those contracted by other customers. The other customers
are statistically equivalent. In other words, differences in buying ability can impact the
project's innovation outcome; however, except for the DoD's poor performance as
compared to other satellite customers, the differences are insignificant.
'0 Although the assumption of equal variance for the multiple pair-wise t-tests is likely violated, several pair-wise
checks (allowing for unequal variances between samples) were run and yielded similar results. Thus it is believed
that the equal variance assumption is acceptable in this case.
" Details on the statistical analysis used to generate the results in this paper are available from the authors upon
request; key outputs are included in the appendix.
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6.2.2.2 Contractor Main Effect: Does the expected high correlation between level of
relative innovation and particular contractors exist?
As above, pair-wise t-tests were performed on the difference between each mean (at the
95% confidence level). Again the Tukey method was used to adjust for multiple
comparisons. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show a summary of the data. Figure 14 highlights the
data points associated with three contractors in particular, showing that while each
contractor shows considerable variations in innovation levels over time, there is no
consistent increasing or decreasing trend in time. Thus the mean innovation level of each
contractor can be compared without considering additional time effects. Figure 15 shows a
box plot of all the comparisons, which yielded an overall F(9,276)-statistic of 1 which
corresponds to a p-value of 0.44. This means that there is no difference, from a statistical
point of view, among the innovation outputs of the various contractors. In other words,
there is no significant correlation between particular contractors and differences in
innovation performance.
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6.2.2.3Customer-Contractor Interaction Effects: Does the expected high correlation
between levels of relative innovation and particular customer-contractor pairs
exist?
Since the previous sections revealed that the individual effects of particular customers and
contractors are effectively insignificant, their interactions effects can be examined directly.
However, there are practical limitations in a historical qu asi- experiment which impact on
measuring the interaction effects. There are a limited number of customers who have
worked with multiple contractors and even fewer pairs of customers and contractors
which have alternated working with each other. Thus, for the purposes of this analysis, the
data set was reduced to programs involving one of Intelsat, Telesat and US DoD paired with
one of Lockheed, Boeing and Space Systems Loral. These firms/agencies were selected
purely because they were the only group with enough data points for any meaningful
statistical analysis. The data is presented graphically in Figure 16.
As noted earlier, in the customer and contractor cases above, there were no apparent
consistent trends in time, making aggregate tests for the difference between means
appropriate; however, this is not the case here. In addition, the limited quantity of data in
each group makes the prospect of achieving statistically significant differences slim (even if
the differences are practically significant). Instead, a regression was performed on each
customer set, with dummy variables for each contractor. The following form was assumed:
Icuiconj(t)Ij = m + Z Mconti(t) (23)
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Even with the limited data, for both the Telesat and Intelsat cases, p-values less than 0.01
were achieved for the overall regression. These differences can be observed qualitatively in
Figure 16. Boeing is the contractor for each of the blue, green and purple data sets yet there
was an observable difference in performance. Similarly, on the customer side, while both
the green and yellow sets are Telesat acquisitions, there is an obvious difference between
the two sets.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Figure 16 is the apparent higher order trend in time.
The nature of this relationship was explored through regression. Least squares fits of the
form
Mconti(t) = m + Yit + Y2t2 (24)
were applied to each customer-contractor pair as shown in Figure 16. While not all
significant (as a result of the sparsity of the data), the p-values (shown on the plot) are
quite low, providing evidence that a second order relationship exists. In addition, a
comparison of Figure 11 and Figure 16 illustrates dramatically, the extent to which
customer-contractor interactions explain variations in innovation performance about the
industry mean.
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7 INTERPRETING THE RESULTS
In the preceding sections, a combination of data mining and statistical hypothesis tests
were used to identify parameters key to explaining communication satellite innovation.
Recalling that the goal of this work is to improve the innovation model developed in ref. 1
and by extension, work towards developing strategies that foster better innovation in the
space sector, this section explains how the above analysis leads to an improved model. It
also examines the extent to which these results can be generalized and can be used to
inform strategy.
7.1 REVISING THE MODEL
Part A argued that innovation can be observed as the rate of change of performance
normalized by cost over time. For the case of communication satellites, the following least
upper bound estimator was proposed:
Innovation = [Power x Life|Psatemfite] (25)
Using the CSD dataset, the following regression model was estimated:
Ln(IM) = 0.132t - 257.7 (26)
However, as discussed above, despite an R2 of 0.7, significant variation remained in the
residuals. This is, in part, because the model only considers technical performance
characteristics and cost factors while ignoring generational and contractual parameters.
Believing that these later two categories would account for a significant portion of the
unexplained variation, the above analysis combined data mining and hypothesis testing to
identify and measure the importance of these factors.
The above analysis estimated both main and interaction effects for the differences between
customers and contractors. Only one main effect was found to be significant; namely, that
of the DoD as customer (McustDoD). The interaction effects associated with several
customer-contractor pairs were also found to be significant. Regression coefficients
(Icuiconj and mij) were calculated for combinations of (Boeing, Lockheed, Loral), (Intelsat,
Telesat, DoD) as discussed in section 6.2.2. When only significant effects are included, the
following model results:
Ln(IM) = 0.132t - 257.7 + McustDoD + Z(mij + Icuiconjt2) (27)
Eq. 27 does not include any generational factors because the analysis revealed that
generational differences have not historically been an important differentiator among the
innovation performances of communication satellites. That is not to say that they can't be
or won't be, especially since architectural parameters have been shown to be more
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important than business ones in other industries.[26] Rather, that there have not been
many major architectural/generational changes and those few have not contributed
statistically as explanatory variables in the regression. For this subset of the data, the
improvement of the overall fit is substantial (compare Figure 11 and Eq. 26 with Figure 16
and Eq. 27) yielding an increased explanation of -60%.
7.2 WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
While there is certainly value to understanding trends in the past, the overriding goal is to
improve decision- making in the future. The question is thus, how can we use the insights
captured in Eq. 27 to improve innovation in the space sector? To answer this question fully
is beyond the scope of this paper, but as a beginning, this section takes a more detailed look
at the implications of the results of the 3 statistical tests performed above. Namely, what
does it mean that: 1) the DoD is the only customer that is different from any of the others;
2) no contractor is different from the others; and 3) some customer-contractor pairs are
different and exhibit a second order relationship in time?
7.2.1 CUSTOMER DIFFERENCES
The customer differences statistical test was premised on the hypothesis that in a
monopsony-oligopoly market, an appropriately advanced requirements specification is
critical to generating innovation. If this were true, it would follow that "smart buyers," who
specified appropriately advanced needs, would generate systematically higher levels of
innovation than their less "smart" counterparts. Since the hypothesis that there would be a
difference was shown to be false in general, though the DoD innovation outcomes were
found to be different than other customers, what might this imply about a) the importance
of requirements specification in general, and b) the DoD acquisition practices in specific?
While the existence of a difference among customers would provide evidence that needs
specification is a key determinant of innovation, the lack of difference does not prove that it
doesn't. This is because customer differences are not perfect equivalents to differences in
how needs are specified. It was hoped that clusters of similar specification strategies would
emerge; however, it may be the case that these strategies are more closely linked to project
teams than organizations and, therefore, the variations within organizations are too large
to observe the differences between them. Since the level of detail required to analyze
spacecraft innovation at the project level is not available at present, other avenues will
have to be explored.
The fact that the DoD acquisitions yielded innovation levels that were systematically lower
than the industry mean is, at least in part, a function of the limitations of the metric. As
discussed in ref. 1, the metric is not sufficiently detailed to capture performance
characteristics such as encryption and redundancy, upon which the military places much
greater value than do commercial operators. In addition the DoD's "block buy" practices,
whereby the price for follow-on satellites are locked into the initial contract, is heavily
penalized by the metric.
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Despite these caveats, the defense acquisition system has received significant criticism in
recent years (see for example ref. [1]) raising the question of whether this hypothesis test
revealed something more significant than a limitation of the metric. One potential
explanation for the DoD's lower ranking on the innovation metric is that the DoD is paying
disproportionately for the cost of industry-wide innovation. Specifically, since DoD
acquisitions contracts include new technology development costs, from which the industry
at large benefits, depending on the magnitude of this investment, they could conceivably
register as below average innovators despite being key drivers of change. The nature of
DoD innovation is explored further in ref. [14].
7.2.2 CONTRACTOR DIFFERENCES
The contractor differences test is premised on the hypothesis that since contractors are in a
better position to initiate innovation than customers (because of the contractors' intimate
component and architectural knowledge), capability differentials among customers will
emerge over time despite having limited incentives to innovate. These capability
differentials should then lead to observable differences in innovation performance, from
which positive attributes could be generalized. Since the hypothesis that there would be a
difference was shown to be false, what does this imply about the importance of contractor
expertise in generating innovation?
While it may be tempting to conclude that a lack of correlation between contractors and
innovation performance suggests there is no differentiation among contractors, such an
interpretation fails to appreciate the nature of the metric used. Innovation output, as
defined in Eq. 1 and implemented in Figure 6, measures planned performance normalized
by contract price; it does not account for discrepancies between contract and delivery,
which, as illustrated in recent history, can be significant (e.g., AEHF, NPOESS, SBIRS-High,
GPS II). [1]
When the innovation history is viewed as a whole, this inability of the metric to capture
delivery price performance is not a major limitation because lessons learned will be
captured through the definition of the next specification; however, when particular
projects are associated with particular contractors, the metric's limitation is significant.
This is because much of the innovation value added by contractors occurs during
development and is therefore not reflected in the contract parameters being measured.
Thus, while the negative result of the contractors' differences test reinforces the notion that
top-down specification plays a critical role in driving spacecraft innovation, it does not
prove that differences in contractor expertise are not important as well. For this question
to be tested, a database which reports statistics related to actual delivered performance
and cost will be required.
7.2.3 DIFFERENCES IN CUSTOMER CONTRACTOR INTERACTIONS
The idea behind the customer contractor interactions test is that since the critical task of
specifying appropriately advanced needs is the customer's responsibility while the detailed
knowledge required to do so is possessed by the contractors, then successful collaboration
between customers and contractors will lead to higher levels of innovation. The test would
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identify successful and less successful pairings which can then be examined in more detail
to extrapolate generalizable characteristics. Since the hypothesis that there would be a
difference was shown to be true within the limits of data availability, what does this imply
about how customer contractor relationships should be structured in order to foster
successful innovation over time?
The fact that some customer-contractor relationships work better than others is not in
itself surprising or a particularly useful categorization. The more interesting element of the
above result is the evidence of a second order time trend that it revealed (see Figure 16),
because it yields insight into the structure of the relationship. This structure can be
understood in one of two ways. Either the second order relationship is 1) a general
phenomenon which results from the underlying innovation dynamics in the sector, or 2) it
is the result of the particular set of historical circumstances and would be unique to each
development.
Considering first the innovation theory point of view, a second order trend is consistent
with the tension between stability and invention that characterizes the innovator's
dilemma.[23] While long term working relationships tend to breed trust and
collaboration[26] which are conducive to incremental innovation and increased efficiency
within the existing paradigm, they also limit new ideas which typically come from entrant
firms.[23] It therefore makes sense that levels of innovation would increase initially, but
level off and decrease as the relationship became too stable.
On the other hand, consider, for example, the Intelsat-Boeing relationship (captured by the
blue trend line in Figure 16 which shows the most pronounced instance of higher-order
behavior in time. In this case, the second order relationship can be explained equally well
by an examination of the history. Initially (1965 - mid 70s), Intelsat was the only provider
of commercial communication satellite services and drove innovation in the sector by
specifying increasingly advanced satellites from its supplier Hughes Aircraft (which later
became Hughes Spacecraft, Boeing Spacecraft and Boeing Space Systems, all referred to as
Boeing). For the first five series of satellites (I-V), subsequent satellite requirements were
substantially increased in one area at a time (either capacity or coverage requirements)
and were achieved with innovation in one or two new technologies.[49, 61]
The inflection point in the Intelsat-Boeing curve (in the early to mid 1970s) corresponds to
both an internal and external shift. Internal to the relationship, the level of ambition in the
requirements specification changed; for the last Intelsat-Boeing satellite, series VI, Intelsat
required radically new capabilities in three areas: Capacity, Coverage and Flexibility to be
achieved with five new technology developments.[49] External to the relationship, national
satellite service providers began to emerge to meet the growing network needs. [51] This
had the effect of both increasing and diversifying the buy-side of the market, which could
explain the regression towards the mean in and of itself. Thus, before general statements
can be made about how to structure customer contractor relationships so as to foster
successful innovation, a more detailed survey of more customer-contractor relationships is
required. The next steps involve examining multiple regression results in their detailed
historical contexts, so that underlying innovation strategies can be isolated from other
incidental market and technology factors.
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8 CONCLUSION
In light of the overall objective of better understanding how innovation can, and should,
happen in the space sector, this thesis set out to answer two questions: 1) how can
spacecraft innovation be meaningfully quantified and measured? And 2) using the
aforementioned metric, what lessons can be learned from an analysis of the history of the
communication satellite sector? In response to the first research question, this thesis set out
to frame a discussion of innovation in the space and defense sector. Specifically, it
addressed three aspects of the task of measurement. It began by surveying several distinct
literatures to establish precedence for defining a spacecraft innovation metric. In this way,
a guiding principle was established; that innovations must be a) both novel and useful and
b) can only be observed as change over time. This lead to the definition of spacecraft
innovation as: a measure of how performance outcome (as defined by the user),
normalized by resource constraints (as experienced by the supplier), changes over time.
Innovation can equivalently involve: a) generating a wholly new capability; or b) reducing
the resources required to achieve an existing capability (e.g., making the system cheaper or
lighter). Next, the conceptual trade-offs associated with adopting this principle in the
context of communication satellites were elucidated and treated. By defining product
boundaries along the dimensions of product scope and market transactions, three
paradigms for measurement were proposed; namely, 1) the communication satellite
enterprise; 2) the physical satellite; and 3) communication service. Finally, under the
constraints of historical data collection realities, next-best estimators were put forward as
surrogates for the parameters required to implement the proposed metrics. Based on these
surrogates, the relative merits of each measurement paradigm were illustrated using the
Communication Satellite Database.
The second research question was addressed through a statistical analysis of the
innovation history of the communication satellite sector. Building on a communication
satellite innovation metric developed in Part A and the spacecraft innovation framework
captured in ref. [14], Part B presents a preliminary model of communication satellite
innovation. In addition to innovation being a function of the rate of performance
normalized by price, innovation was found to be strongly influenced by characteristics of
the customer-contractor contractual relationship. Specifically, DoD contracts tend to result
in a lower level of innovation on average as compared to other customers and particular
customer-contractor pairs perform differently and exhibit a second order relationship in
time. In both cases, the observed phenomenon can be explained by a combination of
innovation theory and historical details. Future work will expand the customer-contractor
pair analysis, so that fundamental innovation dynamics can be isolated from particular
historical circumstances. Already, this analysis captured in this thesis has demonstrated
the ability of this preliminary model to explain significant portions of the variations in
innovation performance of hundreds of historical communication satellite programs. In so
doing, it creates a basis for categorizing differences, which is a first critical step in
developing a prescriptive model for innovation strategy.
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8.1 CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis has made several contributions to the state of the art in analyzing innovation in
the space and defense sector, as well as the broader discussion of acquisition reform.
Though the analysis was limited to communication satellites as a sub-class of spacecraft,
the approach is more generally applicable and many of the insights herein extend to other
classes of spacecraft. Following the chronology of the thesis, they are:
1. An approach to quantifying spacecraft innovation:
a. An operationalizable definition of innovation in the space sector.
b. A framework for selecting system boundary paradigms and the
corresponding innovation input and output definitions they entail.
c. A set of idealized and surrogate metrics for each paradigm and a
comparison of alternative analysis techniques.
2. The first detailed attempt to quantitatively analyze innovation in the space
sector.
a. New insights into the impact of customer-contractor interactions on
innovation.
b. Demonstration of the utility of this approach to test policy-relevant
questions.
8.2 FUTURE WORK
The research was explicitly developed as a basis for future work. It is hoped that this
research will be developed along one of the following three thrusts: metric and analysis
tools development; space sector innovation hypothesis generation; and building towards a
theory of innovation in the space sector.
8.2.1 METRIC & ANALYSIS TOOLS DEVELOPMENT
The final metric selected in this Part A was the best available least-upper-bound estimator,
given the current data set. While the metric was shown to be a useful differentiator among
the innovation levels of historically diverse programs, better data will undoubtedly yield
more nuanced results. Throughout Part A, suggestions were made for how different types
of data would make particular methods more or less suitable. That discussion should be
used as a guideline going forward.
8.2.2 SPACE SECTOR INNOVATION HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Part B investigated one particular aspect of the space sector innovation dynamic; there are
many other facets. Future work should investigate other attributes of innovation in the
space sector, through similar statistical hypothesis tests. One promising approach, begun in
[14], is to identify key challenges at the intersection of innovation mechanisms (as
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proposed in the management and innovation literature) and intrinsic characteristics of the
space sector. The challenges can then be abstracted as testable hypothesis to be tested in
the manner presented in this thesis.
8.2.3 BUILDING THEORY FROM HYPOTHESIS TESTS
The refined model, captured in Eq. (27), illustrates how significant portions of the
variations in innovation performance of hundreds of historical communication satellite
programs can be explained through the identification of simple dynamics. However, the
current model is fit on a per-project basis which has limited prescriptive value. The next
step towards a prescriptive model requires a typology of customer-contractor relationship
categories to be defined. More data analysis will help, but it is expected that the
quantitative work will need to be complemented by several carefully selected empirical
cases.
8.3 CLOSING REMARKS
During the Apollo era, federal support for large-scale technological products seemed
unbounded; no objective out of reach. More recently, without the perceived threat of Soviet
conquest, funding has been scaled back significantly and new less-ambitious projects
continue to underperform. Nonetheless, technological progress does continue to be made;
science missions journey to the far reaches of our solar system; warfare has been
revolutionized by ubiquitous, real-time, access to information in deployed locations around
the globe. Clearly, national mobilization in support of "technical stunts" is not the only way
to generate innovation. Rather than wait around for the next Apollo, improving the
acquisition system today requires an increased understanding of how to efficiently utilize
the resources available. Extracting trends from historical innovation data is a start, but so
much more remains to be done, building on the framework developed in this research.
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APPENDIX A: FULL SET OF CONTRACTOR PAIR-
WISE T-TESTS
Sumanwy stats for samples
ResidualAerospaciale R sidual AlcatelAlenia ResiduaLATK ResidualBoeing ResidualEads Astrium ResiduaLGEAstro Space ResiduaLLockhead ResidualRCA ResidualSS/Li
Sample sizes 18 15 72 40 25 15 20 18
Sample means -0.195 0.106 -0.072 0.104 0.104 -0.223 -0.223 -0.256 -0.
Sample standard eviations 0.515 0.807 0.749 0.821 0.502 0.709 0.547 0.726 0
Sample variances 0.266 0.651 0.562 0.675 0.252 .0.503 0.299 0.527 0.1
Weights for pooled variance 0.062 0.051 0.257 0.141 0.087 0.051 0.069 0.062 0.
Number of samples 10
Total sample size 286
Grand mean -0.058
Pooled variance 0.554
Pooled standard eviation 0.744
OneWayANOVA table
Source SS df MS F p-value
Between variation 5.015 9 0.557 1.006 0.4350
Within variation 152.830 276 0.554
Total variation 157.846 285
Confidence intervals for mean differences
Confidence l vel 95.0%
Tukey method
Difference Mean diff Lower Upper Signif?
Residual Aerospaciale - ResidualAlcatelAlenia -0.301 -1.134 0.531 No
ResidualAerospaciale - R sidualATK -0.123 -0.750 0.504 No
ResiduaLAerospaciale - ResidualBoeing -0.299 -0.974 0.377 No
ResidualtAerospaciale - ResiduaLEads A trium -0.299 -1.035 0.437 No
ResidualAerospaciale - R sidualGEAstro Space 0.028 -0.804 0.860 No
ResidualAerospaciale - R siduaLLockhead 0.028 -0.746 0.801 No
ResidualAerospaciale - R siduatRCA 0.061 -0.732 0.855 No
ResidualAerospaciale - R siduaLSS/Loral -0.089 -0.735 0.557 No
ResiduaLAerospaciale - ResidualTRW -0.447 -1.458 0.565 No
Residual AlcatelAlenia - ResidualATK 0.178 -0.497 0.854 No
Residual AlcatelAlenia - ResiduaLBoeing 0.003 -0.718 0.723 No
ResidualAlcatelAlenia - Residual Eads Astrium 0.002 -0.775 0.780 No
ResidualtAlcatelAlenia - Residual GEAstro Space 0.330 -0.539 1.199 No
Residual AlcatelAlenia - ResidualtLockhead 0.329 -0.484 1.142 No
Residual AlcatelAlenia - ResidualRCA 0.363 -0.469 1.195 No
ResidualAlcatelAlenia - Residual SS/Loral 0.212 -0.481 0.906 No
ResiduaLAlcatelAlenia - ResiduaLTRW -0.145 -1.187 0.897 No
ResidualATK - Residual Boeing -0.176 -0.645 0.293 No
ResidualATK - ResiduaLEads A trium -0.176 -0.728 0.376 No
ResidualATK - ResidualGEAstro Space 0.151 -0.524 0.827 No
Residual ATK - ResiduaLLockhead 0.151 -0.451 0.752 No
Residual ATK - Residual RCA 0.184 -0.443 0.812 No
Residual ATK - ResidualSS/Loral 0.034 -0.392 0.460 No
ResidualATK - ResiduaLTRW -0.324 -1.211 0.563 No
ResidualBoeing - Residual Eads Astrium 0.000 -0.607 0.607 No
Residual-Boeing - ResidualGEAstro Space 0.327 -0.393 1.048 No
Residual-Boeing - ResidualLockhead 0.326 -0.325 0.978 No
ResidualBoeing - ResiduaLRCA 0.360 -0.315 1.036 No
Residual-Boeing - ResidualSS/Loral 0.210 -0.285 0.704 No
ResidualBoeing - ResiduaLTRW -0.148 -1.070 0.774 No
ResidualEads A trium - ResiduaLGEAstro Space 0.327 -0.450 1.105 No
ResidualEads A trium - ResidualLockhead 0.327 -0.387 1.041 No
Residual-Eads Astrium - Residual RCA 0.360 -0.375 1.096 No
Residual Eads Astrium - ResidualtS/Loral 0.210 -0.364 0.784 No
Residual-Eads Astrium - ResidualTRW -0.148 -1.114 0.819 No
Residual GEAstro Space - ResiduaLlockhead -0.001 -0.814 0.812 No
Residual GEAstro Space - ResidualRCA 0.033 -0.799 0.865 No
ResidualGEAstro Space - ResiduaLSS/Loral -0.117 -0.810 0.576 No
ResidualGEAstro Space - ResiduaLTRW -0.475 -1.517 0.567 No
ResidualLockhead - ResiduaLRCA 0.034 -0.739 0.807 No
ResidualLockhead - ResidualSS/Loral -0.117 -0.738 0.505 No
ResiduaLLockhead - ResiduaLTRW -0.474 -1.470 0.521 No
ResidualRCA - ResidualSS/Loral -0.150 -0.797 0.496 No
Residual RCA - ResiduaLTRW -0.508 -1.519 0.503 No
Residual SSLoral - ResiduaLTRW -0.358 -1.258 0.543 No
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APPENDIX B: REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR
CUSTOMER-CONTRACTOR PAIRS
Results of backward regression for Boeing and DoD (Purple)
Step 1 -All variables entered
Summary measures
Multiple R 0.9289
R-Square 0.8629
Adj R-Square 0.7259
StErr of Est 0.2023
ANOVA Table
Source
Explained
Unexplained
Regression coefficients
Coefficient
Constant -9983.6836
Pce 10.0910
Pctte -0.0025
SS
0.5155
0.0819
Std Err
3208.1890
3.2382
0.0008
MS,
0.2578
0.0409
t-value
-3.1119
3.1162
-3.1206
F p-value
6.2958 0.1371
p-value
0.0896
0.0894
0.0892
Lower limit
-23787.4066
-3.8419
-0.0061
Results of backward regression for Boeing and Telesat (Green)
Step 1 -All variables entered
Summary measures
Multiple R 0.8901
R-Square 0.7922
Adj R-Square 0.7403
StErr of Est 0.1952
ANOVA Table
Source df
Explained 1
Unexplained 4
Regression coefficients
Coefficient
Constant 0.0834
Pcttc 0.0000
SS
0.5812
0.1524
Std Err
0.1380
0.0000
MS
0.5812
0.0381
t-value
0.6040
3.9054
F p-value
15.2521 0.0175
p-value
0.5784
0.0175
Lower limit
-0.2998
0.0000
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Upper limit
3820.0394
24.0239
0.0010
Upper limit
0.4665
0.0000
Results of backward regression for Loral and Intelsat (Orange)
Summary measures
Multiple R
R-Square
Adj R-Square
StErr of Est
ANOVA Table
Source
Explained
Unexplained
Regression coefficients
Constant
Pcttb
0.9398
0.8833
0.8687
0.1013
Change
0.0000
0.0000
0.0188
-0.0070
df SS
1 0.6206
8 0.0820
Coefficient
30.6946
-7.6680E-06
Std Err
3.9025
0.0000
% Change
0.0%
0.0%
2.2%
-6.5%
MS
0.6206
0.0103
t-value
7.8654
-7.7800
F p-value
60.5282 0.0001
p-value
0.0000
0.0001
Lower limit
21.6954
0.0000
Results of backward regression for Boeing and Intelsat (Blue)
Summary measures
Multiple R
R-Square
Adj R-Square
StErr of Est
0.8212
0.6743
0.5115
0.5020
ANOVA Table
Source df SS
Explained 2 2.0874
Unexplained 4 1.0082
Regression coefficients
Coefficient Std Err
Constant -61239.0430 22115.1934
Pca 62.0578 22.4201
Pctta -0.0157 0.0057
MS
1.0437
0.2521
t-value
-2.7691
2.7680
-2.7668
F
4.1409
p-value
0.0504
0.0504
0.0505
p-value
0.1061
Lower limit
122640.6633
-0.1904
-0.0315
Upper limit
162.5774
124.3061
0.0001
Note: a much better fit (R2=.9) can be achieved with a third order fit; however, no empirical justification
for third order time dependence could be reasoned.
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Upper limit
39.6937
0.0000
